

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET				
SUBJECT: (Optional) Interagency Working Group on Berlin Air Corridors; Preparing for Demonstration Flights				
FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.	
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			DATE	
			29 April 1985	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. NIO/EUR	29 Apr		<i>[Signature]</i>	
2. VC/NIC	30 Apr 85		ABM	
3. C/NIC			8	
4. <i>Del</i>	23 MAY 1985		<i>[Signature]</i>	
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 02217-85

29 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council *HOM*

THROUGH: George Kolt *[Signature]*
National Intelligence Officer for Europe

FROM: *[Redacted]*
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe

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SUBJECT: Interagency Working Group on Berlin Air Corridors; Preparing
for Demonstration Flights

1. On 25 April, an interagency group met at State Department to discuss US plans to test the Soviets' unilateral reservations of allied air corridors into Berlin. Assistant Secretary Burt in the chair announced that earlier in the week, Mr McFarlane had briefed President Reagan on US proposed demonstration flights through Soviet reserved air space. The President approved his proposal for demonstration flights with a proviso that the US act in close concert with Britain and France in reasserting the quadripartite nature of the air corridors and the principle of unimpared Allied access to Berlin. *[Redacted]* of EURA and *[Redacted]* of SOVA accompanied A/NIO/EUR to the meeting.

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2. The meeting then discussed some preparatory steps and tactical issues in implementing the decision. The first demonstration flight tentatively is set between 15 May and 5-6 June. State proposed several rounds of diplomatic contacts to assure Allied cohesion on the plan and lay the groundwork with the Soviets. Burt proposed that the air corridors problem be broached with Foreign Minister Gromyko soon in a joint demarche by Allied Ambassadors in Moscow. Afterwards there will be further trilateral consultations at the NATO ministerial in Lisbon next week. Then the Department of State wants the French and British Foreign Ministers to join Secretary Schulz in making another demarche to Gromyko during their mid-May talks in Vienna.

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3. State argued that, even lacking allied collaboration in the demarches and the demonstration flight, the US should act alone--but only after President Reagan reviews and approves this new option. For the moment, the British, in particular, are not eager to test the Soviets. Both British Foreign Ministry and NATO command officers so far have demonstrated low enthusiasm for the US proposal. At most, the British would have the demonstration flight "trim" the edges of Soviet-reserved air space rather than pose an unambiguous test by using the entire corridor--as the US wants. Burt suggested that President Reagan could raise the issue with Prime Minister Thatcher in Bonn to help enlist full UK support for our proposal.

4. Burt stressed the need to avoid any leaks about the US plan. The fear is that, with detailed warning of our intent, the Soviets would have time to effectively portray the dispute as a technical issue which the US, on its own, is blowing out of all proportion. They might also use conciliatory gestures to weaken Allied willingness to press the larger issue of allied rights to unimpeded access to Berlin--thereby gaining another tacit acceptance of their policy regarding air reservations.

5. Tasking - Burt assigned four papers to be considered at a meeting sometime around 1-2 May.

- The first entails a risk assessment for the demonstration flight, a review of past air corridor confrontations, specific proposals for the first demonstration flight, an outline of the technical problems expected and the likely Soviet response. JCS has the action--with State and CIA participation at the working level. [redacted] of EURA and [redacted] of SOVA are attending a working level session meeting at ISP today and will draft a written CIA contribution on Soviet and West European reactions by 008 Tuesday.)
- The second paper will assess the likely Soviet reactions after the initial test and our options in counterreacting. OSO/ISP has the action with participation by State and CIA. [redacted] will also address these issues in their written contribution.)
- the third and fourth papers are to outline our precise goals (better late than never!) and discuss our tactics and options regarding public diplomacy on the issue. State has the action.

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6. COMMENT: There are ample signs of lingering interdepartmental differences. A JCS representative--Air Force Colonel Homoki--voiced his strong concern that the Soviets would simply shootdown the demonstration flight. He pressed hardest for an organized discussion of our precise

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goals. State officers argued that, overall, Moscow wants no black eyes like KAL at this time and will not react firmly to the demonstration flight. State's confidence in bringing the allies into line was also higher than most. And their go-it-alone option did not receive any serious discussion. In sum, I do not think the venture is being launched with much enthusiasm or agreement here in Washington. END COMMENT

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